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RECENT DECISIONS
Editor-SYLVESTER B. SINACORE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-DuE PROcEss.-By
virtue of L. 1933, Chapter 158, there was established in New York
State a Milk Control Board having the power, among others, of regu-
lating retail milk prices.1 By order,2 such price was set at a minimum
of 90 per quart. Defendant violated said order by selling two quarts
of milk and a five cent loaf of bread for 180. He was indicted and
convicted after properly putting into controversy the question of the
constitutionality of the enactment. On appeal from an affirmance
of the conviction, held, affirmed, that the regulation and control so
authorized by the statute is not violative of the guarantee of due
process afforded by the 14th Amendment. Nebbia v. People, - U. S.
-, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
Without interval since 1862,3 the milk industry has been the
subject of regulation and control by the legislature of New York
State. Repeatedly, unsuccessful attempts have been made to have
such legislation judicially declared unconstitutional, 4 the courts, by
virtue of such decisions, thereby necessarily recognizing that "public
interest" is affected by the industry.5 The establishment of such
fact is the equivalent of declaring the industry to be "subject to the
exercise of the police power." 6 Uniformly, the courts have refused
to limit by definition the scope of the police power.7 Indeed, it has
been declared to be the "least limitable of the powers of govern-
ment." 8 Obviously, if rate regulation and/or price fixing is to be
upheld, it must be sustained, if at all, on the ground that such legis-
I L. 1933, c. 158, §312, subd. e: "After the board shall have fixed the prices
to be charged or paid for milk in any form * * * it shall be unlawful for a
milk dealer to sell or buy milk at any price less or more than such price * * *
and no method or device shall be lawful whereby milk is bought or sold at a
price less or more than such price. * * *"
'Official Order 5, effective April 17, 1933.
'L. 1862, c. 467.
'Instant case.
See People v. Teuscher, 248 N. Y. 454, 162 N. E. 484 (1928).
0 Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 34 Sup. Ct. 681 (1913) ; instant case.
7 WORDS AND PHRASES, 1st, 2d, 3rd series, sub. not. "police power."
It is true that the courts have indicated what would come within its scope.
6 R. C. L. §184. But it is best said that it extends to any or all public needs,
necessities and safeguards. Canfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 17 Sup.
Ct. 864 (1896).
'District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 149, 29 Sup. 6t. 560
(1908) ; People v. Perratta, 253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72 (1930) ; see Eubank
v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 33 Sup. Ct. 76 (1912); People v. Nebbia, 262
N. Y. 259, 188 N. E. 132 (1933).
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lation is a valid exercise of the inherent 9 and inalienable 10 police
power." That its exercise in such cases is valid and not violative
of the due process clause has been conclusively decided by Munn v.
Illinois.12 Moreover, emergencies will extend its scope so that "A
legitimate public purpose may always be served without regard to
the constitutional limitations of due process and equal protection." 13
Even though it be admitted that the more recent trend had been
toward conservatism, 14 ' the proposition has been reiterated by the
courts at various intervals. 15
These thoughts and others have been expressed in, and the
reader is referred to, the last preceding issue of this review.16
W. E. S.
CORPORATIONS-STocKoLDERs' REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS.-
The defendants, directors of the corporation, have wrongfully wasted
and dissipated the assets of the corporation. The plaintiff, stock-
holders, bring this action to recover the value of the assets wrong-
fully wasted by the directors, alleging specific acts of misconduct.
Similar actions were started previously by other stockholders. The
defendant made a motion to dismiss this action on the ground that
there were similar actions pending. Held, a derivative action accrues
to the stockholders of a corporation when its directors have wrong-
fully depreciated its assets even though a prior action had been
commenced. Dresdner, et al. v. Goldnum, Sachs Trading Corp. et
al., - App. Div. -, 269 N. Y. Supp. 360 (2d Dept. 1934).
'Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U. S. (10 How.)
511 (1850).
10 Goszler v. Corporation of Georgetown, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.) 593 (1821);
Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 (1876) ; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,
97 U. S. 25 (1877); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232
U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 364 (1913).
116 R. C. L. §§252, 211, and cases cited. See also Lemieux v. Young, 211
U. S. 489, 29 Sup. Ct. 174 (1908); cf. Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N.
E. 404 (1905) (regulation of sale prices held to be an invalid exercise of
police power), overruled, Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 114 N. E. 809
(1916).
-94 U. S. 113 (1876).
' People v. Perratta, supra note 8, citing People ex reL. Durham Realty
Co. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921); New York ex rel.
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 49 Sup. Ct. 61 (1928).
14 Note (1933) 8 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 82, 84.
' German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612
(1913); O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251,
51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct.
181 (1932) ; see People v. Nebbia, £apra note 8, at 268.
10 Note (1933) 8 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 82.
